Civil Rights- Supreme Court Hear Challenges to Southern Voter Regisration Systems by Editors,
CASE NOTE
CIVIL RIGHTS-SuPREmE COURT HEARS CHALLENGES TO
SOUTHERN VOTER REGISTRATION SYSTEMS
The Supreme Court has noted probable jurisdiction in two critical
actions I brought by the United States under the Civil Rights Act of 1960 2
in an endeavor to halt two states' continued resistance to court attempts to
enforce the fifteenth amendment.3 In United States v. Louisiana, 225 F.
Supp. 353 (E.D. La. 1963), a three-judge district court held 4 unconstitu-
tional the Louisiana provisions which require a prospective voter to inter-
pret reasonably a section of the state or federal constitution if so requested
by the parish registrar.5 The holding of invalidity was rested on the
'Louisiana v. United States, 377 U.S. 987 (1964) (No. 1073, 1963 Term; renum-
bered No. 67, 1964 Term) ; United States v. Mississippi, 377 U.S. 988 (1964) (No.
1097, 1963 Term; renumbered No. 73, 1964 Term). The paucity of positive results
from the voter registration drive in Mississippi during the summer of 1964 increases
the importance of these actions. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 20, 1964, p. 13, col. 1. The
extent of Southern white opposition and one of the major problems with enforcing
the right to vote through county-by-county legal actions are illustrated by federal
District Judge Cox's sentiments. At a hearing in which he refused to issue an
injunction to speed up the registration in Canton, Mississippi, this jurist stated that
he was interested in eliminating discrimination but not in whether "the registrar is
going to give a registration test to a bunch of niggers on a voter drive." Watters,
Negro Registration in the South, The New Republic, April 4, 1964, pp. 15, 17. See
also N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1964, p. 20, col. 3. See generally KEY, SOUTHERN PoLIrIcs
IN STATE AND NATION 509-28, 555-77, 644-63 (1949); Hersey, A Life for a Vote,
Saturday Evening Post, Sept. 26, 1964, p. 34.
2 Civil Rights Act of 1960, § 601, 74 Stat. 90, 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (Supp. V, 1964)
[hereinafter this section of the United States Code, and the subsections thereof, are
referred to in the text simply as section and subsection].
3 "Every device of disenfranchisement which the judiciary has destroyed, with
few exceptions, has been replaced by a new scheme designed by the southern states
to perpetuate the myth of 'white supremacy.'" Note, Negro Disenfranchisement-A
Challenge to the Constitution, 47 CoLum. L. Rxv. 76 (1947). Compare Guinn v.
United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) (invalidating Oklahoma "grandfather clause"),
with Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 270-71 (1939) (invalidating Oklahoma statute
"obviously directed towards the consequences of the decision in Guinn v. United
States . . ."). Compare Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944), with Davis
v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872, 878 (S.D. Ala. 1949), affd mem., 336 U.S. 933 (1949)
(invalidating a literacy test "used with a view of meeting the decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States in Smith v. Allwright . . ."). For a review of this
ping-pong match between the Court and the South, see Cushman, The Texas "White
Primary" Case-Smith v. Allwright (1944), 30 CORNELL L.Q. 66 (1944).
4 Circuit Judge Wisdom wrote the opinion, in which District Judge Christen-
berry joined. District Judge West dissented.
6 LA. CONsT. art 8, § 1(d); LA. REV. STAT. § 18:35 (1950). Several registrars
have read these provisions to mean that the applicant need not actually interpret the
(587)
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provisions' purpose 6 and the excessive discretion allowed the registrars.7
The court further enjoined the state from using its new objective citizen-
ship test 8 in the twenty-one parishes in which the interpretation test had
been employed until a complete reregistration of all the voters took place
or the interpretation test lost its discriminatory effect on the parish.9
In United States v. Mississippi, 229 F. Supp. 925 (S.D. Miss. 1964),
the Government sought, inter alia, a holding that several of the state provi-
sions dealing with voter registration,' including a required constitutional
interpretation test, had the same constitutional infirmities as had been
found in Louisiana. Its petition requested adequate equitable protection
against the continuation of this state program of prohibiting Negro en-
constitutions, but only be able to do so. Although the state board of registration once
maintained that an applicant must demonstrate his ability, it no longer does so. The
majority in Louisiana found that some registrars had applied the test only to Negroes,
some had chosen more difficult clauses for Negroes, and others had refused to accept
reasonable interpretations from Negroes. 225 F. Supp. at 382-83.
0 The court's opinion presents a historical survey of the franchise in Louisiana,
relying mainly on commentators on southern history. The convention that adopted
the interpretation test was closed. Remarks by public officials and public opinion as
reported in the state's newspapers indicate that the convention's purpose was to
replace the "grandfather clause" invalidated by Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347
(1915). Following passage in 1921 the test was not employed since the only signifi-
cant election, the Democratic primary, excluded Negroes. When the Supreme Court
prohibited "white primaries," Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944), and the
efforts of Negro organizations intensified, the Louisiana legislature established a
joint committee to "maintain segregation of the races in all phases of our life in
accordance with the customs, traditions, and laws of our State." La. H. Con. Res. 27
(1954), quoted in 225 F. Supp. at 378. The chairman and the counsel of this legis-
lative committee incorporated a private group to promote the activities of the com-
mittee. The group and these men distributed literature and met with the registrars.
They worked with the registrars in purging nearly all registered Negroes from the
lists for not taking the interpretation test, but left Caucasians who had similarly not
taken the test registered. The registrars then began using the interpretation test
to keep the list clean of Negroes. 225 F. Supp. at 363-80.
7225 F. Supp. at 391: "When a State constitution gives raw power to a registrar
to grant, or to withhold registration as he sees fit, the constitution violates both the
due process and the equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment."
8 Contemporaneously with the Government's institution of the instant action,
Louisiana first passed a statute, LA. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 18:191 (Supp. 1963), and
then a constitutional provision, LA. CoNsT. art. 8, § 18, empowering the board of
registrars to prepare an objective test to determine whether a prospective voter
understood the duties and obligations of citizenship. A test consisting of multiple
choice questions was prepared.
) The court retained jurisdiction for "the purpose of allowing the United States
to prove and the State to disprove that the interpretation test was used in any of the
forty-three parishes not named in the Court's decree, and for other purposes." 225
F. Supp. at 398.
I' The Government challenged constitutional provisions establishing a reading,
writing, and interpretation test, Miss. CoNsT. art. 12, § 244, and an undefined standard
of "good moral character" to be determined by the registrar, Miss. CoNsr. art. 12,
§ 241-A, and statutes allowing disqualification by registrar for faulty completion of
application forms, Miss. CoDE ANN. § 3213 (Supp. 1962), and other registration
provisions. This Note will deal specifically with the validity of the interpretation
test, although the analysis can be applied to the other provisions.
CASE NOTE
franchisement."1 The three-judge court held,12 inter alia: (1) the court
lacked jurisdiction because the United States was unauthorized to bring
the suit; (2) the state was not a proper party; and (3) all the provisions
under attack were valid.' 3 The action was dismissed for failure to state
a claim upon which relief could be granted.
JURISDICTION
Subsection (d) of 42 United States Code section 1971 14 gives the
federal courts jurisdiction in all actions brought under that section. Sec-
tion 1971(c) provides:
(c) Whenever any person has engaged or there are reason-
able grounds to believe that any person is about to engage in any
act or practice which would deprive any other person of any
right or privilege secured by subsection (a) or (b) of this section,
the Attorney General may institute for the United States, or in
the name of the United States, a civil action or other proper pro-
ceeding for preventive relief, including an application for a per-
manent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other
order.15
11 The court was requested to issue injunctions against enforcing the challenged
provisions, engaging in any act that would deny the vote on the basis of race or
color, and using any test that bears a direct relationship to the quality of education
afforded applicants. The Government also requested that the court find a pattern
and practice of racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1971(e) (Supp. IV, 1963),
and that all Negro applicants who are residents, over 21 years of age, not convicted
of a crime, and who can read be allowed to register. Jurisdictional Statement for
Appellant, p. 6, United States v. Mississippi, 377 U.S. 988 (1964) (No. 1097, 1963
Term; renumbered No. 73, 1964 Term) (noting probable jurisdiction).
12 The late Circuit Judge Cameron wrote the opinion of the court. District Judge
Cox concurred, accepting Cameron's opinion in full. Circuit Judge Brown dissented.
Circuit Judge Wisdom was originally designated but relieved himself and was replaced
by Circuit Judge Cameron. Brief for Appellant, p. 9 n.3, id.
13 The court found that the provisions were valid on their face and had "trans-
parent and completely unambiguous" meanings. It therefore refused to go "delving
into supposed legislative intent, history and purpose." 229 F. Supp. at 948.
14 Civil Rights Act of 1957, § 131(d), 71 Stat. 637, 42 U.S.C. § 1971(d) (1958).
15 Civil Rights Act of 1957, § 131 (c), 71 Stat. 637, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1971(c)
(Supp. V, 1964). The constitutionality of this subsection was upheld in United States
v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960). Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. at 356-57, and the dissent in
Mississippi, 229 F. Supp. at 976, asserted that the Government could bring these
actions under the Constitution without statutory authorization. Judge Wisdom in
Louisiana quoted In Re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 584 (1894): "'The obligation which
[United States] is under to promote the interests of all and to prevent the wrongdoing
of one resulting in injury to the general welfare, is often of itself sufficient to give
it standing in court."' The breadth of this doctrine is unsettled. In the cases cited
by Judge Brown in Mississippi, the Government as a political entity had been fraudu-
lently misled, United States v. Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315 (1888) ; United States v.
San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U.S. 273 (1888), or its order had been disregarded, Sanitary
Dist. v. United States, 266 U.S. 405 (1925). Although the rights defended in the
instant cases are those of private individuals, it may be argued that the Government
has standing because its interest in the very process by which it is constituted is
analogous to its interest in the above cases, or because the controversy has given
rise to such a nationwide conflict that it has become a Government responsibility. It
is unnecessary and unwise to make such constitutional determinations in the present
cases, since there is a statutory grant of authority.
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Subsection (a) reads:
(a) All citizens of the United States who are otherwise
qualified by law to vote at any election by the people in any State,
Territory, district, county, city, parish, township, school district,
municipality, or other territorial subdivision, shall be entitled and
allowed to vote at all such elections, without distinction of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude; any constitution, law,
custom, usage, or regulation of any State or Territory, or by or
under its authority, to the contrary notwithstanding. 16
The Mississippi court stated that the Government had not alleged that
some person was discriminating against "otherwise qualified" Negroes,
since it explicitly claimed that it was alleging not discriminatory action,
but rather the invalidity of state standards. The court asserted that it
therefore lacked jurisdiction because the action did not come within the
statute.17 However, the Government alleged that there were Negroes who
had been denied the franchise on account of their race.' s In its allegations
the Government was merely attempting to make clear that it was attacking
the constitutionality of the provisions rather than accepting their validity
and attacking the application. Such a narrow reading of the complaint
by the court contravenes the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.19
The court's opinion also suggests that the section does not authorize
attacks upon the constitutionality of any state constitution or statute. This
suggestion ignores holdings to the contrary by the Supreme Court.
20
18 Force Act of 1870, § 1, Rxv. STAT. § 2004 (1875), as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1971(a) (1958).
'7229 F. Supp. at 943-45.
18 See id. at 942-43 (by implication). "The Complaint . . . alleges racial dis-
crimination to be the clear purpose and inevitable effect of the challenged provisions,
and that through use by Mississippi registrars the purpose and effect are actually
achieved." Brief for Plaintiff, p. 9.
19 FED. R. Civ. P. 8(f). "[T]he simple guide of Rule 8(f) [is] that 'all pleadings
shall be so construed as to do substantial justice' . . . . The Federal Rules reject
the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may
be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to
facilitate a proper decision on the merits." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957).
20 See Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) ; Meyers v. Anderson, 238
U.S. 368 (1915). These cases imply that the subsection is coextensive with the
fifteenth amendment. This interpretation is also suggested by subsection (a)'s legis-
lative history. See CoNG. GLoBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3485, 3571 (1870). The
legislative history of subsection (c) also suggests that it was intended to enable the
Government to bring actions to invalidate statutes. See H.R. REP. No. 291, 85th
Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1957) ; Hearings on S. 83 Before the Subcommittee on Consti-
tutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 1st Sess.
191 (1957); Hearings on HR. 6127 Before the House Committee on Rules, 85th
Cong., 1st Sess. 130 (1957). To hold as in Mississippi is to require a person dis-
criminated against to satisfy unconstitutional as well as constitutional laws in order
to be "otherwise qualified." This seems absurd, cf. Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370
(1880), and ignores the last clause of the subsection.
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JOINDER OF THE STATE
The Mississippi decision also held that the state was not properly a
party to the actionm2 Subsection (c) authorizes bringing actions against
the state as well as its officers:
Whenever, in a proceeding instituted under this subsection any
official of a State or subdivision thereof is alleged to have com-
mitted any act or practice constituting a deprivation of any right
or privilege secured by subsection (a) of this section, the act or
practice shall also be deemed that of the State and the State may
be joined as a party defendant and, if, prior to the institution of
such proceeding, such official has resigned or has been relieved of
his office and no successor has assumed such office, the proceeding
may be instituted against the State.22
Mississippi held that this subsection made it possible to make the state
a defendant only when the registrar was unavailable. This holding dis-
regards the explicit statutory language granting authorization for two
distinct situations: (1) where no registrars are available, the action must
be brought against the state or not at all; (2) in other cases the state may
be joined at the behest of the Government.
The court suggested an alternative ground based on United States v.
Atkins,23 decided by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. That
opinion said, in a footnote, that a general injunction forbidding discrimina-
tion need only be issued against those officials responsible for the adminis-
tration of the law in the particular parish, explaining that the state should
not be enjoined unnecessarily.24 In relying on this footnote, the Mississippi
court erred in two ways. First, the state was joined in the suit in Atkins
and was dismissed as defendant only after trial, when the court found it
unnecessary for complete relief. Second, the courts have interpreted
section 3 of the Civil Rights Act of 186625 as commanding the courts to
construe jurisdictional grants in the most effective way for the protection
of federal rights:
[I]t comprehends those facilities . . . which will permit the full
effectual enforcement of the policy sought to be achieved by the
statutes.
* ' *'Thus § 1988 declares a simple, direct, abbreviated
test: what is needed in the particular case under scrutiny to make
the civil rights statute fully effective? 26
21229 F.Supp. at 941.
22 Civil Rights Act of 1960, § 601(b), 74 Stat. 90, 42 U.S.C. 1971 (c) (Supp. V,
1964).
23 323 F.2d 733 (5th Cir. 1963).24Id. at 740 n.8.
25REv. STAT. § 722 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1958).26Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 401, 408-09 (5th Cir. 1961); accord, Lefton v.
City of Hattiesburg, 333 F.2d 280, 284 (5th Cir. 1964) ; cf. Pritchard v. Smith, 289
F.2d 153, 157 (8th Cir. 1961).
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In the present case the alleged constitutional problem is not, as in
Atkins, only the enforcement of particular standards by local registrars.
The whole registration system, administered by the governor, legislature,
and board of election commissioners as well as the local registrars, is under
attack. The policy of discrimination effected pursuant to the constitutional
and statutory provisions is statewide in effect. Thus the simplest and most
effective remedy is against the state. Moreover, the alternative is separate
actions in each county against the registrar, in which the state would be
the actual defendant. That procedure would inconvenience the state as
much as the Government and therefore serve only to delay elimination of
the discrimination.
Although not deciding the issue, the Mississippi court said that the
statute might be unconstitutional if read as permitting the action to be
brought against the state itself.27 It said that it felt obliged to interpret
the statute narrowly in order to avoid this constitutional issue. The court
suggested that the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments do not authorize
legislation providing for actions to be brought against the state itself. In
support of this interpretation, it quoted from past cases such language as
the following:
The state itself is an ideal person, intangible, invisible, and im-
mutable. The government is an agent, and, within the sphere of
the agency, a perfect representative; but outside of that, it is a
lawless usurpation. . . . That which, therefore, is unlawful be-
cause made so by the supreme law, the constitution of the United
States, is not the word or deed of the state, but is the mere wrong
and trespass of those individual persons who falsely speak and act
in its name.28
While acknowledging that these cases held only that, despite the eleventh
amendment, individuals may sue state officers for violations of the four-
teenth and fifteenth amendments, which restrict only "state" action, the
court gave credence to the argument that the same reasoning makes the
fourteenth and fifteenth amendments completely inapplicable to state
entities.
Although the language quoted seems to provide substantial support
for the court's position, such language was not necessary to the resolution
of the issue in the cases in which it was articulated. There is no reason why
the amendments should not be read to apply to both the state and officers
acting under color of its laws. Moreover, even if creation of this fiction
of the state as an idealism incapable of acting unconstitutionally may have
27 229 F. Supp. at 933-41.
28 Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 290 (1885), quoted in 229 F. Supp.
at 934-35. The court also quoted from Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347 (1879),
and cited United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 25 (1960); Cooper v. Aaron, 358
U.S. 1, 16-17 (1958) ; and Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), in support of its
conclusion. 229 F. Supp. at 934-35.
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been useful in order to enable individual suits against state officials under
the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments to clear the hurdle of the eleventh,
it is inapplicable when the federal government, unhampered by the eleventh
amendment or residual state sovereign immunity,29 brings the suit.30
THIE MERITS
The fifteenth amendment prohibits a state from denying or abridging
"the right of citizens of the United States to vote . . . on account of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude." The courts are the only bastion
for the protection of the rights of a group which has been denied the vote
and has thus lost its voice in the political process. They should therefore
be wary when scrutinizing provisions which allegedly result in withholding
the franchise from any group, especially one that had no voice in the en-
acting legislature.31
The Supreme Court has held that evidence that only Caucasians have
served on juries in a particular county for several years, despite the presence
there of Negroes, constitutes prima facie proof that there has been sys-
tematic exclusion based on race.3 2  To rebut such proof, the state must
demonstrate that the lack of Negro jurors was based on legitimate criteria.
Likewise, the Government's uncontroverted showing that registration pro-
visions have excluded only Negroes from the polls 3 3 should be prima facie
proof that there was a violation of the fifteenth amendment
3 4
This proof, however, would not indicate whether the violation lay in
the constitution and statutes themselves or simply in their application. In
the present cases the Government alleged that the discrimination by the
29 See, e.g., United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947); United States v.
Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 646 (1892).
30 See 229 F. Supp. at 979, where Judge Brown in dissent described the majority's
reasoning as the "Eleventh Amendment dialectic."
31 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938);
Lzwis, GmzoN's TRUMPEr 210-13 (1964).
2 Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U.S. 773 (1964) (per curiam); Reece v.
Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 88 (1955) ; Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954). These
decisions are particularly significant since the qualifications for jury eligibility are
often the same as those for voter registration. See, e.g., Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356
U.S. 584, 586 (1958).
3 3 Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. at 381-85, 385 n.81, 386 n.82. This was based on "a
great mass" of evidence introduced into the record by the Government. In Mississippi
the Government alleged that the registration provisions attacked had a like effect
and that it had similar evidence of a purposeful discrimination. The allegation was
reinforced with documented, voluminous answers to interrogatories. Brief for Appel-
lant, pp. 3, 16-17, 20-23, United States v. Mississippi, 377 U.S. 988 (1964) (No. 1097,
1963 Term; renumbered No. 73, 1964 Term) (noting probable jurisdiction).
84 It may be argued that evidence showing that only Negroes were excluded by
an objective registration standard, such as requirement of a high-school diploma, should
not be prima facie proof of discrimination. However, it seems that whenever such
a discriminatory effect is evidenced, the state should have to show that this effect
was not both foreseen and the very purpose of the standard's enactment. Cf. McGowan
v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). Perhaps the burden upon the state may vary
with the particular standard attacked. Special heed should be paid when the objective
standard is based on facts which can be or are determined by state regulation, such
as control of who gets a high-school diploma.
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registrars was in compliance with the mandate of the provisions. It pre-
sented evidence that the exclusion of Negroes was statewide.35 Building
upon the presumption from this evidence that the registrars discriminated
in performing their functions under the statute, the Government should
succeed in attacking the statute upon proving that: (1) the provisions'
language describes such broad discretion that it can be read to embrace the
discriminatory applications; and (2) the social settings in which the words
operate make such a reading the most likely one. Then, unless the states
could show that the purposes of the provisions are inconsistent with ap-
plication based on race, the provisions should be held invalid.
The states claimed that the provisions establish voter qualifications
without regard to race. Louisiana presented no evidence of the provisions'
validity other than their language.3 6 The words of the state interpreta-
tion tests do not set any qualification standard. Two operational features
in the provisions indicate that they do not really establish a required level
of competence: (1) the local registrars who are to judge the applicants'
qualifications need not have any knowledge of constitutional law; (2) the
registrars are left free to choose constitutional articles greatly varying in
difficulty for different applicants. Thus the actual requirements fluctuate
with the varying capabilities of the registrars and the different burdens
they wish to impose on different applicants. Rather than setting standards,
these provisions grant the task of drawing the qualification line to each
registrar. Thus the provisions can be read as consistent with discrimina-
tory application.
The Government argues that, given the political tradition in which the
registrars operate, the control the majority political power has over their
selection,3 7 and the segregated society in which they must live 3 8 and from
which they are selected, a grant of power to discriminate along racial lines
is not only a possible reading of the provisions' mandate, but a probable
one. In view of the provisions' language and effect and in order to protect
constitutional rights adequately, the courts should treat the evidence sup-
35 See Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. at 385 n.81; Mississippi, 229 F. Supp. at 932.
36 The defendants did not file a brief in Louisiana, thus apparently relying on
the words of the provisions. The opinion in Mississippi suggests that the defendants'
claim was that the state can establish voter qualifications, and that the plain words
of these provisions indicate that they are nondiscriminatory tests of a candidate.
229 F. Supp. at 945-48. The court also incorporated the opinion in Darby v. Daniel,
168 F. Supp. 170 (S.D. Miss. 1958), in which it was held that to require a candidate
to understand the form and genius of the government was reasonable. Id. at 183.
37 In Louisiana the registrar in all but one parish is appointed by the governing
body of the parish, LA. REv. STAT. § 18:1 (1950), for a term of good behavior, LA.
REv. STAT. § 18:3 (1950), and he must be a qualified voter, LA. REv. STAT. § 18:2
(1950). In Mississippi registrars are appointed by the state board of election com-
missioners, which is composed of the governor, secretary of state, and attorney general,
Miss. CODE ANN. § 3204 (1956), for four year terms. The board also appoints the
county election commissioners, who can review the registrars' decisions de novo.
Miss. CODE ANN. § 3205 (1956).
8 "[I]f any test of understanding were applied at all to any substantial number
of citizens of status, the registrars would be hanged to the nearest lamp post and no
grand jury could be found that would return a true bill" KEY, SOUTHERN PoI.rrIcs
IN STATE AND NATION 577 (1949).
CASE 7NOTE
porting this argument as prima facie proof that these discretion-granting
provisions are invalid. Since the legislation's mandate is manifested only
in part by its language and application,3 9 it is still open for the state to rebut
this proof of invalidity by showing that the socio-political context at the
time of enactment indicates that discrimination is contrary to the provisions'
mandate.40 To counter any such showing of purpose, the Government
proffered evidence that the state has had a historical policy of denying
the vote to Negroes 41 and that legislative debates, newspaper articles, and
official actions indicate that the provisions were enacted to shield white
political supremacy from post-World War II Negro organizational attack
and from the effects of court-integrated political primaries and schools.
42
In Gomillion v. Lightfoot,43 the Supreme Court was confronted with
another line claimed by the plaintiffs 'to be drawn for the sole purpose
of excluding Negroes. Alabama had passed a statute which changed the
Tuskegee city limits from a "square to an uncouth twenty-eight sided
figure" 45 which wove among the houses so as to exclude only Negroes
and thus deny them a vote in municipal elections. Alabama had claimed
that the words of the statute indicated that it was simply a districting line,
which was within the state's political power to draw. The Court, shoulder-
ing its responsibility to guard against "sophisticated as well as simple-
minded modes of discrimination," 4 6 directed the trial court to look further
than the statute's language and hear evidence with regard to the statute's
purpose. If the state could not prove a purpose other than discrimination
39 As observed by Mr. Justice Frankfurter:
Legislation has an aim; it seeks to obviate some mischief, to supply an
inadequacy, to effect a change of policy, to formulate a plan of government
That aim, that policy . . . is evinced in the language of the statute, as read
in the light of other external manifestations of purpose.
Often the purpose or policy that controls is not directly displayed in the
particular enactment Statutes cannot be read intelligently if the eye is closed
to considerations evidenced in affiliated statutes, or in the known temper of
legislative opinion.
Frankfurter, Some Reflections on. the Reading of Statutes, 47 CoLum. L. Rzv. 527,
538-39 (1947).
40 Cf. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 466-67 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (holding that fact that state closing laws fell on Sunday was not due
to an unconstitutional purpose to establish a religion); Hall v. St. Helena Parish
School Bd., 197 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. La.), aff'd iner., 368 U.S. 515 (1961) (in-
validation of a local-option school closing law because of a racially discriminatory
purpose); Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala.), "aff'd mer., 336 U.S.
933 (1949) (alternatively holding that the purpose of a voter registration interpretation-
test violated the fifteenth amendment).
4 1 Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. at 363-81; Mississippi, 229 F. Supp. at 985-93.
42 Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. at 363-81; Brief for Appellant, pp. 10-20, United States
v. Mississippi, 377 U.S. 988 (1964) (No. 1097, 1963 Term; renumbered No. 73,
1964 Term) (noting probable jurisdiction).
43 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
44 Cf. Davis v. Schnell, 336 U.S. 933 (1949); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268
(1939) ; Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915).
45 364 U.S. at 340.
46 Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939).
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for this deliberate fluctuation in the line, the statute was to be held invalid.
4"
The Supreme Court should issue a similar order to the Mississippi district
court 4 s and should affirm the invalidation of the Louisiana voter registra-
tion line, which the district court found was deliberately designed by the
legislature to fluctuate so as to deny the right to vote on account of race.
The interpretation tests contain another constitutional infirmity.
Granting a legitimate purpose, these provisions delegate to the registrars
too vast a discretion in determining who can vote. The combination of the
denotative imprecision of "reasonable" with the ambiguity of constitutional
phrases gives the registrars such a broad discretion that it allows them
to make determinations on the basis of caprice or impermissible dis-
crimination.
Although degrees of discretion are necessary for a government to be
flexible enough to cope with the problems of a complex society,49 the due-
process guarantee of the fourteenth amendment requires an even-handed
rule of law and not arbitrary regulation based on whim.5 ° To accommodate
the requirement of order through government with preservation of in-
dividual liberty, due process will vary with particular situations and regu-
lations according to the dictates of fairness.8 ' A thorough analysis of the
47 Upon remand the district court found the districting statute unconstitutional.
TAPE, GomxuaoI vrsus LiGnTFooT 116 (1962). The same district court held that
the county registrar had been discriminating against Negroes and ordered those
qualified to be registered and other measures designed to eliminate discrimination.
Ibid. As a result of these two court orders, Tuskegee has elected to the city council
its first two Negroes since Reconstruction days. Philadelphia Bulletin, Sept. 16,
1964, p. 3, col. 7 (4 star ed.).
48 Discrimination against Negroes, on the Government's theory, has not
resulted from discriminatory administration of valid laws. It has happened
because it was meant to happen. To eradicate this evil, the attack need not
be made piece by piece. It may be made by a frontal assault on the whole
structure. What the Government is saying is that Mississippi knows that this
was the purpose, and now all it wants is for the Court to see what "all others
can see and understand," since there "is no reason why courts should pretend
to be more ignorant or unobserving than the rest of mankind."
Mississippi, 229 F. Supp. at 998 (Brown, J., dissenting). (Brackets omitted.)
49 " 'Delegation of power to administration is,' however, 'the dynamo of the
modern social service state.' It has made possible the vast, pervasive growth of
administrative process, which few would now, and no one could, abolish." Bicnm,
THE LEAsT DANGEROUS BRANCH 161 (1962).
5o See Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 322 (1958); Saia v. New York,
334 U.S. 558, 561 (1948) ; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369-73 (1886). It is
unclear whether the ordinance in Yick Wo was invalid under the due process clause.
See id. at 373. The weightier authority reads the opinion as holding only that the
administration of the ordinance violated the equal protection clause. Lassiter v.
Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50 (1959) ; BicKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH 217 (1962) ; Amsterdam, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in
the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. Rxv. 67, 113 (1960), in SmEcrD EssAYs ON CoN-
sTrruTIONAL LAw-1936-1962, at 560, 597 (Association of American Law Schools
ed. 1963) [hereinafter cited as SEIcrED ESSAYs]. Yet in past decisions the Court
has stated that Yick Wo held the ordinance itself invalid. Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 291 (1912); Atchison, T. & S.F.R.R. v. Matthews, 174
U.S. 96, 105 (1899) ; Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213, 224 (1898).
51 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 96 (1940) ; Schneider v. State, 308 U.S.
147, 161 (1939) ; see Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 515-16 (1963) ; Culombe
v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961); Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436,
441-42 (1957).
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Supreme Court decisions where statutes have been challenged as granting
too much discretion through vague language has indicated that:
[T] he ultimate response of the Court will depend upon the nature
of the individual freedom menaced, the probability of its violation,
the potential deterrent effect of the risks of irregularity and viola-
tion upon its exercise, and the practical power of the Court itself
to supervise the scheme's administration. . . . Finally, into the
process of weighing these considerations there enters . . . the
principle of necessity.52
Today's Court has most often articulated the limitations on adminis-
trative discretion in cases dealing with the individual freedom of expres-
sion.53 Since the Court has also recognized the vote as the fundamental
force of a democratic government,54 the right to vote free from dis-
crimination requires at least as much protection as freedom of expression.55
There is a high probability of discrimination under the veil of this
statutory authorization. The denial of the vote to Negroes is a most effec-
tive means of securing white political supremacy. In a setting which for
several decades has evidenced official discrimination, there are strong rea-
sons for inferring a high probability that an official given discretionary
power will racially discriminate sub silentio. The Court has already sug-
gested that a greater risk lies in administrative discretion than in the
52 Amsterdam, snepra note 50, at 94-95, SELECTED ESSAYS 581-82. (Footnotes
omitted.) Put in somewhat less analytical terms: "It follows that in deciding upon
the admissibility of flexible or indefinite terms, regard must be had to the circum-
stances under which, the persons by whom, and the sense of responsibility with which,
the law will be applied, and to the consequences which an error will entail." Freund,
The Use of Indefinite Terms in Statutes, 30 YALE L.J. 437, 438 (1921). Professor
Alexander Bickel sees the problem in terms of legislative responsibility:
A vague statute delegates to administrators . . . the authority of ad hoc
decision, which is in its nature difficult if not impossible to hold to account
In addition, such a statute delegates authority away from those who
are personally accountable, at least for the totality of their performance, to
those who are not, at least not directly. In both aspects, it short-circuits the
lines of responsibility that make the political process meaningful.
BICKEL., THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 151 (1962). He later reaches criteria
similar to Amsterdam's: "When should the Court recall the legislature to its own
policy-making function? Obviously, the answer must lie in the importance of the
decision left to the administrator or other official. And this is a judgment that will
naturally be affected by the proximity of the area of delegated discretion to a con-
stitutional issue." Id. at 161.
53 See, e.g., Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 321-25 (1958).
54 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) ; Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1
(1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339
(1960); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268
(1939). "Though not regarded strictly as a natural right, but as a privilege merely
conceded by society according to its will, under certain conditions, nevertheless [the
franchise] . . . is regarded as a fundamental political right, because preservative of
all rights." Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (dictum). (Emphasis
added.)
55 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938);
BicKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 210-11 (1962) ; EMERSON & HABER, PoLM-
CAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATrS 137-38 (1958); LEwIS, GmEoN's
TRUMPEr 210-13 (1964).
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potential for courtroom foul play.56 There are stronger grounds for this
distrust of administrative discretion when the determination of who can
vote rests with an official whose very office depends on who votes.
The vague registration standard is likely to have the effect of deterring
many Negroes from trying to register. Due to the registrar's ability to
change the acceptable interpretation at his discretion, the Negro desiring to
vote has no clear goal towards which to strive.5 7 A candidate who wishes
to educate himself does not know what to learn in order to be able to give
a "reasonable" interpretation. 5 8 The applicant's difficulty is heightened
when, upon failing, he is not told where he erred.59 Furthermore, the
Negro realizes that there are strong social and economic pressures against
his trying to register.60 In order to attempt to register, therefore, he must
run a substantial risk without the least assurance that he can satisfy the
registrar.6 1
Judicial control of the exercise of such a discretionary standard is
practically ineffectual.0 2 Probing the registrar's mind is generally more
difficult than reviewing court determinations, where the adversary system
is operative and records are kept. Although the Court may look more
favorably on administrative discretion when the state courts have demon-
strated a willingness to curb the official's power and have supplied guiding
standards, 8 no such state court control is evident here. Furthermore, the
56 Amsterdam, supra note 50, at 94 & n.142, SELEcrEm EssAYs 581 & n.142.
67 For one registrar "FRDUm FooF SPErTG" was an acceptable interpretation of
article 1, § 3 of the Louisiana constitution, whereas for another "to search you would
have to get an authorized authority to read a warrant!' was unacceptable as an inter-
pretation of the fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Louisiana,
229 F. Supp. at 384.
58 Cf. United States v. Duke, 332 F2d 759, 763-66 (5th Cir. 1964).
59 Registrars are not to disclose reasons for finding an applicant unqualified (except
when "not of good moral character"). Miss. CODE ANN. § 3212.5 (Supp. 1963).
For general discussion of practices in Louisiana see 225 F. Supp. at 383-85. For
instances where it was felt necessary for the elimination of discrimination to order
the registrars to disclose reasons for failure see United States v. Fox, 334 F.2d 449,
451 (5th Cir. 1964); United States v. Clement, 231 F. Supp. 913, 918 (W.D. La.
1964) ; United States v. Crawford, 229 F. Supp. 898, 903 (W.D. La. 1964).
60 Marshall, Federal Protection of Negro Voting Rights, 27 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROB. 455 (1962). For a case of official physical intimidation in Mississippi see
United States v. Wood, 229 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 850
(1962). For one of economic intimidation in Louisiana see United States v. Deal,
described in Marshall, supra at 459. See generally Hersey, A Life for a Vote,
Saturday Evening Post, Sept. 26, 1964, p. 34.
'1 Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall has reported: "We were once
puzzled by counties in which, although fear was not a factor, few Negroes applied
to register. We know now that the bulk of a Negro community considers attempting
to register to be an idle gesture after a few of their teachers and ministers have been
rejected as unqualified." Marshall, supra note 60, at 455-56 n.7.
2As Mr.-Justice Frankfurter said of a similarly vague standard held to be invalid:
,"[T]he available judicial review is in effect rendered inoperative. On the basis of
suffh a portmanteau word as 'sacrilegious,' the judiciary has no standards with which
to judge the validity of administrative action which necessarily involves, at least in
large measure, subjective determinations. Thus, the administrative first step becomes
the last step." Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 532 (1952) (concurring
opinion).
* 0 Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953). Compare Cox v. New
Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941), with Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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gathering of evidence of discriminatory administration is handicapped by
Caucasian hostility and Negro fear.64
Nor is this discretion necessary.65 If the purpose is to assure an
electorate aware of constitutional principles or one with a certain level of
intelligence, it can be accomplished through the administration of pre-
determined questions with predetermined answers. Thus the registrar's
task would be ministerial 66 and the probability of constitutional violation
minimized.
Examination of the relevant factors indicates that in the setting of
Louisiana and Mississippi society, the discretion allowed the registrars
violates the due process guarantee of the fourteenth amendment.
RELIEF
The prejudicial effect of a discriminatory registration statute is not
eradicated by a simple declaration of unconstitutionality. Application of
the statute will have denied Negroes the opportunity to register under the
less demanding standards concurrently employed for Caucasians. To ex-
tirpate such discrimination, the court must provide for the registration of
all eligible Negroes under standards identical to those met by Caucasians.
In subsections (C) 67 and (e) 68 Congress has granted the court certain
powers to deal with discrimination in voter registration. Subsection (c)
authorizes the court to entertain an action for "preventive relief" against
discriminatory practices and to issue "a permanent or temporary injunction,
restraining order, or other order." Subsection (e), enacted three years
later, grants the court specific power to effect a detailed affirmative remedy.
Upon a finding of discrimination, the court is to make,69 on the Attorney
General's request, a further finding whether the discrimination was pursuant
64 Assistant Attorney General Marshall has also pointed out that one of the
problems his office has encountered is that most often, due to a lack of communication
between Caucasian and Negro communities, especially in rural areas, the Negroes
are unaware they are being discriminated against and just assume they are not as
qualified as the registered Caucasians. Marshall, supra note 60, at 465.
65 Cf. McLaughlin v. Florida, 85 Sup. Ct. 283, 290-91 (1964) (opinions of the
Court and Harlan, J., concurring) ; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 & nn.8 & 9
(1960).
66 See Cantvell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306 (1940).
67 Civil Rights Act of 1957, § 131(c), 71 Stat. 637, 42 U.S.C. § 1971(c) (1958).
68 Civil Rights Act of 1960, § 601(a), 74 Stat. 90, 42 U.S.C. § 1971(e) (Supp. V,
1964).
69 Despite the apparently mandatory language of the statute, which provides that
upon request the court "shall . . . make a finding," some courts have held
that subsection (e) does not make a finding on pattern compulsory, thus arrogating
to themselves discretion to render the subsection inoperative in a particular case.
United States v. Ramsey, 331 F.2d 824, rev'd on other grounds on rehearing, 331
F.2d 838 (Sth Cir. 1964) ; United States v. Raines, 203 F. Supp. 147 (M.D. Ga. 1961).
But see United States v. Ramsey, supra at 835-36 (Rives, J., dissenting) (legislative
history conclusively shows Congress intended finding on pattern to be mandatory
vhen requested). Section 101(d) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 241,
42 U.S.C.A. § 1971(h) (1964), limits the discretionary power of the single judge on
pattern-finding by permitting the Attorney General to call for a three-judge court
to make the finding.
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to a "pattern or practice." 70 If such a pattern or practice is found, the
court, with the aid of federal voting referees 71 if it wishes, may declare
qualified to vote any person within the affected area who proves that
"(1) he is qualified under State law to vote, and (2) he has since such
finding by the court been (a) deprived of or denied under color of law the
opportunity to register to vote or otherwise to qualify to vote, or (b)
found not qualified to vote by any person acting under color of law."
"Qualified under State law" is defined as "qualified according to the laws,
customs, or usages of the State," and the subsection specifies that the
phrase should not be taken to imply standards more stringent than those
actually employed by the registrar in enrolling persons not subjected to
racial discrimination.
It is possible to argue that the scope of subsection (e) is limited.
When the Government contends that a certain state registration statute
should not be applied to Negroes, it places itself in an apparently incon-
sistent position if it also seeks relief under subsection (e), as it may seem
to be requesting the court to declare Negroes qualified to vote under the
very standards it is alleging are inapplicable to them.72 The inconsistency
is not an actual one. There are two possible situations. For one, Cau-
casians may have been enrolled without regard to the requirements of the
particular statute. Since this statute has not been applied to those placed
on the voting lists without racial discrimination, it cannot be considered
part of the customary registration standard. Subsection (e) therefore
applies, because it recognizes that a person can be qualified under the
"customs or usages" of a state without being qualified under the "laws"
thereof.73  Thus, even when the court invalidates the statute,74 the cus-
7oIt may reasonably be contended that a pattern or practice is automatically
established when a statute is held unconstitutional.
71 See generally 72 YALE L.J. 770 (1963).
72 Cf. Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 486 (1903) (Holmes, J.).
73 Cf. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 176-78 (1961) (action under § 1 of the
Ku Klux Act, REv. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1958), which makes a
similar distinction among "statute, ordinance, regulation, custom [and] . . . usage") ;
id. at 258-59 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Compare the approach of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter where no such distinction was available:
It would be a narrow conception of jurisprudence to confine the notion of
"laws" to what is found written on the statute books, and to disregard the
gloss which life has written upon it. Settled state practice cannot supplant
constitutional guarantees, but it can establish what is state law. The Equal
Protection Clause did not write an empty formalism into the Constitution.
Deeply embedded traditional ways of carrying out state policy . . . are often
tougher and truer law than the dead words of the written text.
Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362, 369 (1940) (fourteenth
amendment).
74 To provide relief in the immediate situation, the court need not reach the
issue of the statute's constitutionality. Since the alleged discrimination consists of
applying the statutory standard to Negroes only, the court could provide a remedy
which merely enjoined the state from applying that standard to Negroes who were
of registration age when the statute was in use. Such relief, however, would leave
the state free to apply this standard to all future applicants, and thus to discriminate
further against Negroes, necessitating the filing and litigating of a separate and
time-consuming suit to test the validity of the statute. This could only result in
the further deferment of full rights for the Negro.
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tomary standard is unaffected, and enrollments may be ordered thereunder.
Subsection (e) is equally applicable in the second situation where the
statutory test has been applied to all groups, albeit in such a manner as to
discriminate against one. A declaration of unconstitutionality effectively
removes this statute from the field so that a person may demonstrate his
qualification to vote under state law by meeting the tests of the remain-
ing registration statutes which will include, at the very least, an age
requirement.
75
The scope of subsection (c) has been challenged by the assertion that
Congress, in authorizing "preventive relief," meant to limit the courts to
negative injunctions.7 6 That mandatory injunctions may also be issued
under the subsection is revealed by its legislative history and by a recent
decision.77 The Senate debates indicate an appreciation that the sub-
section authorizes the court to issue mandatory decrees.78 Such specific
decrees as a temporary restraining order requiring a registrar to enroll
Negroes discriminatorily denied the opportunity to register,7 an order
compelling a registrar "to report back to the court at fixed intervals" on
his efforts to comply with a remedial decree,80 an order to post and other-
wise publish notices concerning new registration procedures, 8' and an
order to replace on the voting rolls a Negro illegally removed therefrom 
82
were recognized as falling within the scope of the subsection. The House
report accompanying the Civil Rights Act of 1957 announced the bill's
purpose as being "to permit the Federal Government to seek from the civil
courts preventive or other necessary relief in civil-rights cases." 8 More-
75 Cf. Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 363 (1915):
[A]s the command of the Amendment was self-executing and reached without
legislative action the conditions of discrimination against which it was aimed,
the result might arise that as a consequence of the striking down of a discrimi-
natory clause a right of suffrage would be enjoyed by reason of the generic
character of the provision which would remain after the discrimination was
stricken out. . . . A familiar illustration of this doctrine resulted from the
effect of the adoption of the Amendment on state constitutions in which at
the time of the adoption of the Amendment the right of suffrage was conferred
on all white male citizens, since by the inherent power of the Amendment
the word white disappeared and therefore all male citizens without discrimi-
nation on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude came under
the generic grant of suffrage made by the State.
76Alabama v. United States, 304 F.2d 583, 597-600 (5th Cir.) (Cameron, J.,
dissenting), aff'd mem., 371 U.S. 37 (1962).
77 Compare Sherman Act § 4, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 4
(1958) : "The several district courts of the United States are invested with jurisdiction
to prevent and restrain violations of this Act . . . ." Mandatory decrees have
often been granted under this section. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States
221 U.S. 1 (1911) (divestiture).
78 E.g., 103 CONG. REc. 12460 (1957) (remarks of Senator Morse): "So much
has been said of injunction that it has been all but overlooked that the proposed
provisions would enable the issuance of mandatory decrees after full trial on the
merits."
70 Id. at 12696 (remarks of Senator Long).
80 Id. at 12805 (remarks of Senator Morse).
8 1 Ibid.
8 2 Id. at 12844 (1957) (remarks of Senator Case).
83H.R. REP. No. 291, 85th Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (1957). (Emphasis added.)
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over, in Alabama v. United States,8 the Supreme Court affirmed-with-
out discussion-the Fifth Circuit's holding that subsection (c) authorized
the court to order the registration of certain named Negroes found to have
been denied registration discriminatorily.8
The traditional 8 6 equity powers of the federal courts form an important
backdrop for subsection (c). Courts of equity may provide remedies
adapted to the peculiar circumstances of each case arising under the equity
jurisdiction.8 7 In fashioning its decree a court of equity may grant either
prohibitory Is or mandatory 8 9 relief, and, when the situation requires an
extraordinary remedy to protect the jeopardized right, the court may tailor
one to meet the needs of the caseY0 An early case, Giles v. Harris,91 held
that without specific congressional authorization the court could not employ
these powers to compel the registration of certain Negroes discriminatorily
denied registration:
The traditional limits of proceedings in equity have not embraced
a remedy for political wrongs. . . . Apart from damages to the
individual, relief from a great political wrong, if done, as alleged,
by the people of a State and the State itself, must be given by
them or by the legislative and political department of the govern-
ment of the United States.
92
The continuing vitality of Giles has been put in serious doubt by the
Supreme Court's refusal to apply its reasoning in the area of reapportion-
ment.9 3 It might be argued, however, that the decision as to who shall
vote is more basic than the determination of the weight to be given the
84 371 U.S. 37, affirming mem. 304 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1962).
8 5 It might possibly be objected that, although subsection (c) was originally a
broad grant of powers to the court, subsection (e) limited that grant, under the
canon expresslo unius est exclusio alterius, by authorizing one specific affirmative
remedy. Whatever other merit such a claim might have, it ignores the specific dis-
claimer contained in subsection (e), which announces that "this subsection shall in
no way be construed as a limitation upon the existing powers of the court." Civil
Rights Act of 1960, § 601(a), 74 Stat 91, 42 U.S.C. § 1971(e) (Supp. V, 1964).
86 See Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 164-65 (1939) ; Atlas Life
Ins. Co. v. W. I. Southern, Inc., 306 U.S. 563, 568 (1939).
87 See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955) ; Hecht Co.
v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944) (dictum); Alabama v. United States, 304 F.2d
583, 591 (5th Cir.), aff'd mem., 371 U.S. 37 (1962); United States v. Raines, 203
F. Supp. 147, 151 (M.D. Ga. 1961) (dictum).
8
8 McCLINTOc , Egurry § 15 (2d ed. 1948); see, e.g., United States v. Atkins,
323 F.2d 733, 745 (5th Cir. 1963).
89 MCCLINTOCK, EQUITY § 15 (2d ed. 1948) ; see, e.g., Mitchell v. Robert DeMario
jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288 (1960) (restitution of lost wages ordered); Porter v.
Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946) (restitution of excess rents ordered).
Such affirmative relief is not a recent innovation. See Vane v. Lord Barnard, 2 Vern.
738, 23 Eng. Rep. 1082 (Ch. 1716) (order to repair vandalized castle at defendant's
expense).
9 o McCLINTOCK, EQurrY § 42 (2d ed. 1948) ; see, e.g., Ilyin v. Avon Publications,
Inc., 144 F. Supp. 368, 374-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
91189 U.S. 475 (1903).
92 Id. at 486, 488.
93 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208-37 (1962); cf. Gomillion v. Lightfoot,
364 U.S. 339, 347-48 (1960).
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ballot of an admittedly qualified voter, and that the Giles rationale is there-
fore still applicable to voting rights cases.4 Even if this argument is
accepted, relief is not precluded in the present cases, as, in awarding the
same type of relief denied in Giles, the Fifth Circuit indicated in the
Alabama case 91 that the Giles requirement of congressional authorization
had been met by the enactment of subsection (c). In addition to the
Alabamz decision,9 6 the Senate debates on the subsection indicate that it
was designed to confer upon the federal courts equitable jurisdiction in the
field of voting rights. 97 Senator Carroll, for example, was careful to
point out:
It ought to be perfectly clear what is the legislative intent of those
who are proponents of the bill. . . What we are talking about
is a function of a court of equity, and whether the Attorney Gen-
eral will be given the power to move into that court, and whether
the court in the exercise of its equitable jurisdiction can protect
the constitutional right to vote prior to a criminal violation. 98
Viewed in this light, subsection (c) appears to be an authorization for the
court to devise adequate equitable remedies "to assist in the enforcement
of the right to vote," one of the stated purposes of the Civil Rights Act of
1957.11
In devising a remedy for deprivation of voting rights, the court must
keep the interests of the state in view. States possess broad discretionary
powers to fix nondiscriminatory standards for registration.10° Moreover,
these powers have been depicted by the Supreme Court as ones "without
. which . . . the whole fabric upon which the division of state and
national authority under the Constitution and the organization of both
governments rest would be without support and both the authority of the
nation and the State would fall to the ground." 101 In formulating its
remedy the court should therefore balance such considerations against the
necessity for effective protection of invaded constitutional rights. Such a
balancing shows mechanical invocation of the subsection (e) remedy to be
94 See id. at 346.
9 5 Alabama v. United States, 304 F.2d 583, 592 (5th Cir.), aff'd iem., 371
U.S. 37 (1962).
9OId. at 590: "In prescribing a suit to be brought by the sovereign for equitable
relief, the statute contemplates that the full and elastic resources of the traditional
court of equity will be available to vindicate the fundamental constitutional rights
sought to be secured by the statute."
97See 103 CONG. Ric. 12843 (1957) (remarks of Senator Case); cf. id. at
12148-49 (remarks of Senator Clark).
98ld. at 13295.
H.R. REP. No. 291, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1957).
loo It has long since been settled that "the privilege to vote in a State is within
the jurisdiction of the State itself, to be exercised as the State may direct, and upon
such terms as to it may seem proper, provided, of course, no discrimination is made
between individuals in violation of the Federal Constitution." Pope v. Williams, 193
U.S. 621, 632 (1904) ; accord, e.g., Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections,
360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959) ; Camacho v. Rogers, 199 F. Supp. 155, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
10 1 Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 362 (1915) (dictum) (grandfather
clause of Oklahoma constitution declared unconstitutional).
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quite inappropriate, as that course necessarily deprives the state of its power
to make the actual selection of its electorate. Where less extreme but
equally effective methods are available, they should be given precedence by
the court.102
Where the court is obliged to invalidate a state registration statute, or
to enjoin the state from applying such to Negroes, it must award relief
which will both adequately and moderately meet any possible state response
threatening further discrimination. After the statute is declared uncon-
stitutional, the state has two alternatives. It may either take no action or
move to fill the void by enacting a new registration statute. If it adopts
the former course, the court may more easily safeguard the right to vote.
Judicial excision of the discriminatory statute does not leave the state
without statutory standards under which to conduct registration. 0 3 At
the very least, an age requirement will remain. Since such a standard does
not suffer the constitutional infirmities of the invalidated statute, the
court's major function is to enjoin the state from changing the availability
of registration by such tactics as closing registration centers.1° 4 Negroes
previously denied registration under the former statutory test will then be
enabled to register under standards no more stringent than those applied
to their Caucasian counterparts.
The court must also provide for the possibility that the state will enact
a new registration statute. Unless some precaution is taken, the state could
easily evade the invalidation of the previous statute by passing an equally
objectionable one.'0 5 The court should therefore retain jurisdiction so that
the constitutionality of any new standard can be tested without delay or
possible prejudice to future applicants.' 0 6 Moreover, even if a new statute
102 See United States v. Ramsey, 331 F2d 824, 829 (5th Cir. 1964); United
States v. Raines, 203 F. Supp. "147, 151 (M.D. Ga. 1961). The courts have been
most reluctant to appoint federal voting referees under subsection (e). See, e.g.,
United States v. Manning, 206 F. Supp. 623 (W.D. La. 1962); United States v.
Association of Citizens Councils, 196 F. Supp. 908, 912 (W.D. La. 1961); United
States v. Alabama, 192 F. Supp. 677, 683 (M.D. Ala. 1961), aff'd, 304 F.2d 583
(5th Cir.), aff'd mem., 371 U.S. 37 (1962).
'
0 3 But see United States v. Palmer, 230 F. Supp. 716 (E.D. La. 1964) (Louisi-
ana decree held to leave state without a registration standard).
104The decree might also order the state to (1) keep its registration centers
open for stated periods every day; (2) keep a full staff (number stated) at work
during those periods; (3) process a certain number of applications per hour; (4)
obtain all information needed for the registration records at the time any test is taken;
(5) notify all applicants within a week whether they passed or failed, giving specific
reasons for any failures; and (6) enter the names of all who pass the test on the
registration rolls without requiring their return to the registration center. See
United States v. Mississippi, No. 21212, 5th Cir., Dec. 28, 1964; Alabama-v. United
States, 304 F.2d 583, 584-85 (5th Cir.), aff'd mien., 371 U.S. 37 (1962). To prevent
harassment the court should also enjoin the state from requiring any proof of age
other than a birth certificate or other objective proof. Should any problems of dis-
crimination nevertheless arise, they might be met by the approach discussed in the
text accompanying notes 112-13 infra.
105 See, e.g., Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939) (Oklahoma prescribed a limited
registration period for those who had not voted in general election of 1914 after Court
invalidated grandfather clause).
106 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586-87 (1964) (reapportionment) ;
Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1955) (school segregation);
Ross v. Dyer, 312 F.2d 191, 192, 194 (5th Cir. 1962) (school segregation) ; Moss v.
Burkhart, 220 F. Supp. 149, 153-55 (W.D. Okla. 1963) (reapportionment).
CASE NOTE
is found to meet constitutional requirements, the court should enjoin the
state from applying it to any person, Caucasian or Negro, who was of regis-
tration age when the invalidated statute was still on the books, unless the
state conducts a total reregistration of its electorate.10 7 Were this not done,
Negroes who were discriminatorily denied or deterred from seeking' 0
registration would be subjected to a test which enrolled Caucasians of the
same age did not have to meet, thus entrenching the past discrimination. 10 9
Because the previous statute was unconstitutional, the courts should afford
the same protection to unenrolled Caucasians of the same age group.
Finally, the court should order the state to administer its registration tests
on a standard form and to retain all completed forms for a specified
period.1 Without such an order, the new test would be plagued by the
same discretion the court has already found impermissible, as a registrar
would be in a position to enroll whomever he chose. He could contend
that a Negro had failed or that a Caucasian had passed, and there would
be no way to verify his statement. A completely constitutional standard
is no remedy if a registrar retains the power to render it meaningless."'
The state's interests are fully protected by the remedy just described, for
the state retains full power thereunder, subject only to the customary
constitutional restrictions, to both set and apply registration standards
within its borders.
The relief outlined above is devised to meet the problems posed by
an unconstitutional registration statute. If discrimination continues after
the creation of a valid standard, however, the court is faced with still other
problems. The nature of the standard being unobjectionable, the dis-
crimination can only occur in the application of that standard. Where
more than a minimal number of state registrars are shown to have dis-
criminated in their application of the registration standard, strong evidence
has been adduced that the statewide pattern of racial discrimination already
found by the court has not ceased. In such a situation the heart of the
problem is not the particular state official who administers the registration
107 United States v. Duke, 332 F.2d 759, 769-70 (5th Cir. 1964).
10 8 See notes 57-61 mipra & accompanying text.
109 See Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 49-50
(1959): Appellant argues that that is not the end of the problem presented by the
grandfather clause. There is a provision in the General Statutes for perma-
ment registration in some counties. Appellant points out that although the
cut-off date in the grandfather clause was December 1, 1908, those who reg-
istered before then might still be voting. If they were allowed to vote without
taking a literacy test and if appellant were denied the right to vote unless she
passed it, members of the white race would receive preferential privileges of
the ballot contrary to the command of the Fifteenth Amendment.
This question was not decided in Lassiter because it was not incorporated in the
issues framed for state litigation. See Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. at 393.
o10 Section 301 of the Civil Rights Act of 1960, 74 Stat. 88, 42 U.S.C. § 1974
(Supp. V, 1964), already requires the retention of all such records in federal election
registration.
111 Under the same reasoning the court should enjoin registrars from aiding appli-
cants in answering. Such injunction could best be enforced by periodic, unannounced
checks of registration centers by court-appointed agents.
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standard in a discriminatory fashion, but rather the control of the state
over the registration process. So long as the state is free to select the
officials who will administer the test, the probabilities are high that the
registrars thus installed will discriminate against Negroes. The necessity
for adequate relief requires that the court deprive the state of such power.
One solution would be for the court to appoint federal registrars to
administer the state standard and to declare qualified to vote any person
who meets all the requirements thereof.'12 Such an official could also
enroll any individual found to have satisfied the requirements previously
and purge all those enrolled despite unsatisfactory qualifications. 118 The
federal registrar should continue to administer the standard until the state
could prove that its policy of racial discrimination had been abandoned.
Such a showing could be made by objective means, the state proving,
inter alia, that it had desegregated its schools and complied with specified
civil rights legislation."14 The subsection (e) remedy would be insufficient
in this situation, as it would put Negroes to the inconvenience of seeking
registration twice-once from the state and once from the court. More-
over, a Negro who went to the federal voting referee or the court would be
subjected to the psychological pressure of knowing that the community
would soon find out about his action and quite possibly retaliate against
him. If a federal registrar were employed for all applicants, Negroes
would not be thus singled out and would be less deterred from seeking
registration.
It might be objected that the peculiar state interest in regulating its
franchise should discourage the court from employing the federal registrar
remedy. Utilization of this remedy would encroach upon an area of state
interest, but the relative weight of this loss, when balanced against the
national interest in safeguarding the right to vote and the individual's
interest in exercising his constitutional rights, would appear to be small.
Since, however, the remedy does interfere with state administration of its
internal affairs, it should be reverted to only after the state has demon-
strated that the creation of a valid standard will not preclude it from
discriminating against Negroes. Once this situation has become apparent,
the court will have strong justification for taking the application of the
standard from the state. Until that time the court should focus upon the
standard itself, so that the state may have the opportunity to cleanse its
own Augean stables.
112 These should not be confused with the federal voting referees of subsection
(e), as the nature of the relief described in the text accompanying note 113 infra is
not explicitly authorized by that subsection. The recommended relief could be afforded
under subsection (c)'s grant of equity powers.
I1 This could be made possible by having the registrars examine the applications
of all those enrolled under state administration of the test. If a critical number of
tests had been altered in such a manner as to make the actual answers unintelligible,
a complete reregistration would be necessitated.
114 The exact standards comprising a showing that the policy of discrimination
had ceased should be left for the court to formulate in each case, so as to adapt the
measure to the particular situation presented. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education,
349 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1955).
